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This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested social
dilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into two
groups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoretically
derived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental results
demonstrate the importance of in-group beneﬁciaries over global eﬃciency.
We ﬁnd that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect
conditional cooperation that prioritizes local level feedback. Results stress
the importance of building strong local level commitment to encourage the
provision of public goods with positive externalities.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0221. Introduction
”Imagine there’s no countries. It isn’t hard to do. Imagine no pos-
sessions. I wonder if you can.”1 Global public goods constitute a class of
common goods available to all humankind. At the same time, the provision
of virtually any global public good embodies interrelated spheres of inﬂu-
ence on multiple scales. The nature of the good itself, spatial limits, and
human-made borders regularly create local barriers, resulting in production
externalities on national, regional, and communal scales. This paper is about
voluntary contributions to a public good with local and global dimensions
through positive spillovers.
Protecting the global climate probably manifests the timeliest and most
acknowledged global level social dilemma with local dimensions. While the
increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has created a dramatic con-
tingency of changing living conditions on a global level, manufacturing and
transportation technologies releasing air pollutants have several locally deter-
mined consequences including ﬁne-particulate air pollution and traﬃc con-
gestion problems, among others. Amid the myriad of other global goods with
local externalities, some particularly noteworthy ones are locally directed
foreign aid to reduce global terrorism, regionally and universally signiﬁcant
university systems, and the preservation of natural wildlife habitats.
The study of pure public goods (Samuelson, 1954) and other single scale
social dilemmas has long been in the foreground of behavioral economics.
1The opening sentences naturally pay tribute to Lennon (1971) who introduced the
notion of a global public good earlier - and perhaps more vividly - than any research
economist has done since. Luckily, we are all economists.
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 022Within the standard approach, positive contributions by individual decision
makers are automatically available to all participants. In a typical public
good with linear payoﬀ function, the lowest possible individual contribution
is the dominant strategy (Isaac et al., 1984). The stylized facts originating
from single dimensional public good experiments are extremely robust (Led-
yard, 1995). The voluntary provision of a public good is socially suboptimal.
Positive contributions are, however, frequent but typically decline with rep-
etitions from the initial level toward the equilibrium. Positive contributions
have been observed after as many as 50 periods (G¨ achter et al., 2008).
It appears that the observed level of cooperativeness is not tied to a
boundary condition. Isaac and Walker (1991) refute the conjecture that con-
tributions are aﬀected merely by shifting the location of the equilibrium to
an interior condition of the set of feasible contributions. Subsequent stud-
ies with interior dominant and eﬃcient strategies have found no systematic
evidence for this conjecture (Laury and Holt, 2008).
The question of how to overcome the experimentally conﬁrmed failure of
voluntary contribution mechanisms has emerged as one of the most funda-
mental issues in the social sciences. Notable theoretical reﬁnements, includ-
ing the Folk Theorems (Aumann, 1981; Axelrod, 1984) for repetitive interac-
tion and elements of uncertainty questioning the common knowledge of ratio-
nality (Kreps et al., 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982), oﬀer an equilibrium justi-
ﬁcation for positive contributions stabilized through future dealings. Among
the vast body of institutional solutions, enforceable commitments (Schelling,
1960), self-governed sanction mechanisms (Yamagishi, 1986) intertwined with
communication(Ostrom et al., 1992), reputation networks (Nowak and Sig-
mund, 1998), leadership structures (G¨ uth et al., 2007), and ostracism (Maier-
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the problem of free riding.
At the same time, numerous structural and motivational approaches have
been suggested to investigate the impact of intergroup competition on hu-
man cooperation (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). When payoﬀs are contin-
gent upon the relative ranking or absolute diﬀerence between the competing
groups and the reward is shared equally among the in-group members, the
individual incentive to cooperate becomes congruent with the group’s inter-
est. Without imposing payoﬀ sharing norms on a group, the self-interested
strategy, however, fails to make any contribution. Various laboratory (Born-
stein and Erev, 1994) and ﬁeld (Erev et al., 1993) experiments on intergroup
competition nevertheless reveal increased in-group cooperation. These be-
havioral observations, attesting to the enhanced individual willingness to
sacriﬁce own resources to a group cause, belong to most robust results in
social psychology (Bornstein, 2003).
The study of voluntary contribution mechanisms, including proposed
structural and motivational solutions to the tragedy of the commons, has
thus far largely ignored the potential of joint production beneﬁts on multiple
scales. A notable exception are Cornes and Sandler (1984) and their seminal
theoretical contribution toward understanding the nature of impure public
goods. Their analysis is diversiﬁed to include interdependent private and
public good characteristics. The original idea has later been extended to the
warm-glow of giving as discussed in Andreoni (1990).
The simultaneity of local and global beneﬁciaries in public good provi-
sion has been recognized only in a few behavioral inquiries. Blackwell and
Mckee (2003) and Fellner and L¨ unser (2008) both conduct experiments with
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group have no global-scale consequences. The innate bias toward the local
group is tacitly conﬁrmed. Furthermore, both studies ﬁnd that the relative
returns of the two public goods varying in excludability have a signiﬁcant
impact on voluntary contribution. Buchan et al. (2009) suggest that the in-
dividual propensity to contribute in a multilevel social dilemma is correlated
with global attitudes measured by the Globalization Index survey.
In this paper, we introduce and experimentally implement a novel multi-
level social dilemma model based on a positive interdependency between local
and global beneﬁciaries. Within the game paradigm, individual provision de-
cisions are repetitively realized. Thus, conditional cooperation and implicit
punishment are enabled through appropriate feedback between periods but
not explicitly inspired or experimentally demanded by any institutional ar-
rangements. To capture the nestedness of global and local level stakeholders
in our design, group identities are not only inspired by labeling (the minimal
group paradigm) but also (i.) by stronger positive payoﬀ interdependencies
within rather than between local groups and (ii.) by symmetry within local
groups and asymmetry across local groups.
The advantage of our design is that the paradigmatic conﬂict between
individual optimality and collective eﬃciency is transferred to a situation
where individual opportunism can be questioned both by subgroup and over-
all eﬃciency concerns. Saliently induced local group identity (Tajfel, 1982),
a greater prospect of reciprocity (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000), and conditional
cooperation (Fischbacher and G¨ achter, Forthcoming) within the local group
all predict high resource allocations enhancing local eﬃciency. At the same
time, voluntary contributions toward global eﬃciency are inspired by posi-
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petition to cooperation. Inter alia, Anderson et al. (1998) indicate that
altruistically motivated players increase their contributions to the common
good when beneﬁts are shared by a larger group of recipients. This result
encourages the prediction that altruistic players act upon global eﬃciency.
In comparison to other social dilemma games like, for instance, the fre-
quently used linear public good game, we retain that all players have a dom-
inant strategy regardless of other players’ behavior. Both local and global
eﬃciency require individually costly choices. However, all benchmark contri-
bution levels are implemented in the interior of the feasible choice set. That
is, participants may deviate from each benchmark by choosing either a lower
or higher provision. In our view, this has the advantage that pure noise in
decision making is equally possible below and above the benchmark level.
The necessary nonlinearity is reduced to choice costs, determined by sim-
ple quadratic cost functions. The spillovers from an individual choice are
determined by linear functions, similar to linear public good games. While a
multilevel game with positive spillovers may have a great number of parame-
ters, individual and group characteristics in our experiment are restricted to
include three dimensions. Each player is deﬁned by one cost parameter and
one local and global productivity parameter. Since the local group identity is
inspired by in-group symmetry, we experimentally examine a social dilemma
game determined by six parameters, two cost parameters, and two diﬀerent
sets of local and global parameters. We refer to this game as the Spillover
Game (SG).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
formally introduce and analyze the characteristics of the Spillover Game,
6
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imental protocol. After presenting and analyzing the data in section 4, we
conclude in section 5 with a brief discussion on our results.
2. Spillover Game
Let N = {1,...,n} with n ≥ 2 denote the set of players h =1 ,2,...n,
which is partitioned into two subgroups I = {i1,...,i mi} and J = {j1,...,j mj}
with mi,m j ≥ 2a n dmi +mj = n. We use notation k ∈ N for any player as
well as i ∈ I and j ∈ J when referring to players in a certain subgroup.





with dh > 0 for all h ∈ N. (1)
Player h gains linearly from the production amounts of all players according






kch − Ch(ch)w i t hα
h
k > 0 for all h ∈ N. (2)








i > 0i fh ∈ J,h  = i.
The ﬁrst inequalities capture the regularity that players proﬁt most from
their own contributions; the second inequalities express the greater spillover
toward local subgroup members. The last inequalities render individual con-
tributions globally eﬀective.
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Our Spillover Game experiment is based on parameters
α
h













with 1 > ¯ α
h >α
¯













with 1 > ¯ α
h >α
¯
h > 0 for all j ∈ J.




specifying her cost type dh and how strongly she aﬀects members of her in-
group (¯ αh) and her out-group (α
¯
h). In this setup, opportunism in the sense







If a player h ∈ N, however, only cares for the total payoﬀ of her in-group
and not for her out-group members, she would maximize
[ 1+( mi − 1)¯ αh]ch − Ch(ch)i fh ∈ I,
[ 1+( mj − 1)¯ αh]ch − Ch(ch)i fh ∈ J.
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2 for h ∈ I
[1+(mj−1)¯ αh]dh
2 for h ∈ J.
Global eﬃciency does not restrict eﬃciency concerns to one’s in-group but
suggests to consider all spillovers by maximizing
[ 1+( mi − 1)¯ αh + mjα
¯
h]ch − Ch(ch)i fh ∈ I
[ 1+( mj − 1)¯ αh + miα
¯
h]ch − Ch(ch)i fh ∈ J.














2 for h ∈ J.
In the experiment we will try to strengthen group identity by symmetry
within the in-group by imposing
di =4 ,α h
i =¯ αI and αh
j = α
¯
I such that 1 > ¯ αI >α
¯
I > 0 for all h ∈ I,
dj =6 ,α h
j =¯ αJ and αh
i = α
¯
J such that 1 > ¯ αJ >α
¯
J > 0 for all j ∈ J.
When setting mi =3=mj one, however, still derives the same eﬃciency
benchmarks for both groups by imposing
(LE )( 1+2 ¯ αI)4 = (1 + 2¯ αJ)6 for local eﬃciency (LE) and
(GE )( 1+2 ¯ αI +3 α
¯
I)4 = (1 + 2¯ αJ +3 α
¯
J)6 for global eﬃciency (GE).
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J are such that both (LE) and (GE) are satisﬁed,
whereas in the other two treatments (LE) and (GE) only one of the two
equalities holds. Clearly, opportunism predicts higher production amounts
in subgroup J than in subgroup I due to dj >d i. Members of group I have
higher production costs. Note that producing less than is optimal would
reveal spitefulness. Members of group I may produce less than
di
2 simply
because they consider the game unfair. We, however, expect strong other-
regarding concerns at least toward the members of the in-group whose soli-
darity is inspired by (i.) labeling in the sense of the minimal group paradigm,
(ii.) stronger positive spillovers within than across groups, and (iii.) the sym-
metry of players in the same subgroup.
3. Experimental Procedure
The main characteristic of our experimental design is the interdependence
of voluntary contributions between asymmetric groups, reﬂecting the nature
of global-scale interaction. In our experiment, six subjects form a global
group which is partitioned into two local groups of equal size. In the instruc-
tions, we refer to these distinct but interdependent groups as X and Y and
to the subjects in a corresponding group as X-players and Y-players, respec-
tively. Individual provision decisions, ch, are restricted to integers ranging
from 0 to 10.
Individual choices are collected under three diﬀerent treatments varying
in production eﬃciency between local and global groups. We compare sit-
uations in which X and Y are equally eﬃcient with a situation in which
10
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timal opportunistic, local, and global contribution amounts do not change
between treatments. Similarly, cost parameters used to inspire local group
identity remain ﬁxed across treatments. Table 1 provides a summary of the
applied costs and spillovers in respective treatments. When analyzing the
experimental data in section 4, we refer to a label assigned to each treatment
or drop the treatment labels entirely when analyzing data pooled across all
treatments.
The experiment was implemented applying both stranger and partner de-
sign equivalent to deﬁnitions by Andreoni (1988). All participants played 15
repetitive periods under both matching protocols. At the end of each exper-
imental session, one 15 period block of cumulative earnings was randomly
chosen to determine the ﬁnal payoﬀ from the decision task. The random
draw was performed by one of the participants with a coin ﬂip. The or-
der of matching protocols was counterbalanced across sessions to control for
possible sequence eﬀects. Participants received feedback at the end of each
period regarding the local and global-scale spillovers. We ruled out any kind
of reputation formation within and across subgroups by reshuﬄing the order
of individual contributions displayed after each period. The anonymity of all
players was guaranteed throughout the experiment.
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Max Planck In-
stitute of Economics in Jena (Germany). The experiment was programmed
and run using the z-Tree (Fiscbacher, 2007). A total number of 180 subjects
in six sessions participated in the experiment. The 109 female and 71 male
subjects were mainly undergraduate students from the Friedrich-Schiller Uni-
versity of Jena, studying a range of diﬀerent disciplines. Upon arriving at the
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communication and visual interaction. They were given detailed instruc-
tions and a number of control questions on paper. Instructions were read
aloud including the examples. The experiment began after participants had
answered all control questions correctly. After the experiment participants
were paid privately in cash according to their performance. On average, the
experiment lasted 90 minutes. Earnings per participant ranged from 8 to 26
euros with an average of 15 euros.
Table 1: Experimental treatments with their spillover parameters
Treatment Cost Ingroup Outgroup
parameter spillover spillover
LEGE Type-X 4 0.6 0.3
Type-Y 6 0.4 0.25
LE Type-X 4 0.6 0.3
Type-Y 6 0.4 0.3
GE Type-X 4 0.5 0.4
Type-Y 6 0.5 0.2
4. Results
To characterize the nature of voluntary cooperation in a nested social
dilemma under positive group interdependencies, we organize the discussion
of our results as follows. To begin with, we describe the observed initial
inclination toward the in-group optimum and the ensuing steady decline to-
ward the opportunistic benchmark. Thereafter, the remarkable robustness
of observed behavior is conﬁrmed. Finally, we demonstrate which behavioral
determinants guide individual contribution decisions. The main analysis is
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unobserved sequence and treatment eﬀects are subsequently discussed.
4.1. The nature of cooperation in the Spillover Game
Figure 1 sets the stage for our analysis, depicting the temporal pattern of
average contributions and conveying an unequivocal message. Observed pro-
vision rates occur on average always between the local eﬃciency and the op-
portunistic benchmark. This clearly challenges the explanation of voluntary
cooperation by decision errors (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997) as contributions
below the opportunistic benchmark level are rare even for X-players who,
due to their cost handicap, might be spiteful. More concretely, the ﬁnding
stresses the substance of local level beneﬁciaries in the provision of a public
good with multiple scales.
Result 1 The local eﬃciency benchmark serves as an upper boundary for
average contributions.
Figure 1 about here
Despite the fact that all derived benchmark predictions are located in
the interior of the feasible choice set, they diﬀer according to the type of
player. Y-players deviate more markedly from the local eﬃciency due to
its relative location in the upper half of the decision space, although the
production eﬃciencies remain constant across player types and benchmark
predictions. In other words, the location of the benchmark relative to the in-
dividual choice set aﬀects contributions. This observation is congruent with
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(Isaac and Walker, 1998).
Result 2 The steady decline in contributions unfolds independently of player
type or matching protocol.
Figure 1 creates a qualitative impression of declining contribution rates.
The declining trend is indeed conﬁrmed in table 2, reporting Pearson corre-
lation coeﬃcients between periods and their respective average contributions
for each independent observation. On the aggregate level, the steady decline
in positive contributions prototypical for voluntary contribution mechanisms
is observed irrespective of matching protocol or player type.
Result 3 Partners matching yields higher contribution levels than strangers
matching in the Spillover Game.
Table 2 provides an overview of individual contributions and earnings av-
eraged across all periods. The diﬀerence between ﬁxed group interaction and
randomly repeated single-shot iterations is tested by comparing a set of ob-
servations within subject under both matching protocols. We reject the null
hypothesis of no diﬀerence between partner and stranger design (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test; Z=-3.267, n=18, p=0.001). As a result of this behavioral
pattern, the local eﬃciency benchmark is more closely approximated by sta-
ble groups than randomly changing groups.
How well do the theoretical predictions organize observed data? Table 3
reports average contributions in the ﬁrst and last period of iterative inter-
14
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ences
Stranger Partner
Average Average Time Average Average Time
Cont. Earnings trend Cont. Earnings trend
Type X 2.80 6.57 -.22** 3.06 6.99 -.27**
(.30) (1.02) (.76) (1.27)
Type Y 3.92 7.13 -.19** 4.25 7.43 -.21**
(.15) (0.59) (0.73) (0.83)
Treatment 3.357 3.520 2.468
diﬀerence N.A N.A N.A (df=2) (df=2) (df=2)
p=0.187 p=0.172 p=0.291
Average contributions and earnings in ECUs, standard deviation in parenthesis. Time
trend over all periods is indicated by the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient. Treatment diﬀer-
ences are tested applying Kruskall-Wallis (2-sided) test. Data are analyzed at the group
level to account for the independence of observations. **Signiﬁcant at 1%; *Signiﬁcant at
5%; +Signiﬁcant at 10%.
action. The former empirical outcome is tested against the local eﬃciency
and the latter against the opportunistic optimality benchmark. The down-
ward slope in voluntary provisions is corroborated by comparing the average
rates in the ﬁrst and last period. Despite the fact that a large majority of
individual contributions lie in a range between local eﬃciency and individ-
ual opportunism, these predictions hardly provide accurate benchmarks to
aggregate behavior. The null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between theoretical
benchmark and observed behavior in the respective periods of interaction is
rejected except for two cases (table 3). At the same time, separate test statis-
tics for X- and Y-players strengthen the observation that the predictions’
location relative to the individual choice set aﬀects its prognostic power.
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ﬁrst and last round of iterative interaction
Average contribution (Round 1) Average contribution (Round 15)
- Local prediction - Opportunistic prediction
Stranger Partner Stranger Partner
Type X 3.26 (.80) 3.50 (.92) 2.42 (.24) 2.54 (.72)
(n=6) (n=18) (n=6) (n=18)
p=0.075 p=0.046 p=0.028 p=0.003
Type Y 4.49 (.45) 4.83 (1.20) 3.16 (.27) 3.54 (.80)
(n=6) (n=18) (n=6) (n=18)
p=0.028 p=0.003 p=0.141 p=0.006
Average contributions (and standard deviations) in the ﬁrst and last round. Deviations
from opportunistic and local eﬃciency predictions are tested applying Wilcoxon signed
rank test (2-sided) against the null hypothesis that no diﬀerence exists. All data are
analysed at the group level to account for the independence of observations.
4.2. The robustness of results
Until now, our behavioral analysis has been based on aggregated data ir-
respective of the sequence of play or experimental treatment. In this section,
we discuss the robustness of our preceding ﬁndings considering these issues.
Result 4 The observed behavioral patterns in the Spillover Game are ro-
bust to the sequence of interaction and changes in monetary incentives at
the margin.
The distribution of voluntary contribution decisions proves to be robust
to past decisions. We perform the Mann-Whitney (exact) test against the
null hypothesis that both mean and slope are equally distributed under the
respective matching protocol between a sequence without previous interac-
tion and a subsequent sequence following the ﬁrst 15 periods of play. Test
statistics for the stranger (Z=-1.964, n=6, p=0.100) and partner (Z=-1.008,
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esis.2 As a result, participants who have experienced related interpersonal
encounters do not behave diﬀerently than those without such an experience
in the Spillover Game. The behavioral pattern of public good provision,
ranging from local eﬃciency to individual opportunism, is robust to order
eﬀects.
Changes in the marginal per capita rate of return (MPCR) are consid-
ered to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the willingness to cooperate in public good
games. Similarly, changes in the overall group productivity derived by mul-
tiplying the MPCR with the number of players regularly induce measurable
behavioral changes in individual public good provision.
We examine the inﬂuence of varying payoﬀ parameters in the Spillover
Game by comparing the behavioral response under three diﬀerent treatments.
The general result of varying spillover parameters is suggested in the bottom
half of table 2. The Kruskall-Wallis test for the equality of population medi-
ans between the three treatments does not allow us to reject the null hypoth-
esis that no diﬀerences exist between treatments. Examining the diﬀerences
on a more subtle level, we recognize that the greater out-group spillovers
and increased global eﬃciency between treatments LEGE and GE are likely
to cause a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on Y-players due to the change that is re-
stricted to their productivity. Despite performing a more speciﬁc pairwise
test to examine the behavioral reaction of Y-players (Mann-Whitney exact
2The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample (exact) test that is sensitive to diﬀerences in
both location and shape of the empirical cumulative distribution functions yields similar
results relative to the conceivable sequence eﬀect. All test speciﬁcations tried yield p-values
of 0.1 or higher.
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niﬁcant response to changes in spillover parameters. A similar result holds
irrespective of the player type when testing for possible diﬀerences between
treatments GE and LE. The robustness of aggregated individual responses to
the changes in coeﬃcients reﬂects robust behavioral patterns in the Spillover
Game.
4.3. Determinants of contributions
In this section, we investigate the determinants of observed behavior. We
estimate three diﬀerent multilevel regression models under both matching
protocols, as documented in table 4.
Result 5 The temporal pattern of contributions is a result of imperfect con-
ditional cooperation that prioritizes local level feedback over global one.
Model (1) serves as a starting point of our analysis, including only pro-
duction spillovers received from other in-group members in a period. A
strong inclination toward realized outcomes of preceding interaction is ex-
pected. Consequently, we ﬁnd that subjects reveal a signiﬁcant tendency to
conditional cooperation.
Our results provide strong econometric evidence that conditional cooper-
ation is restricted to in-group interaction. Models 2 and 3 include both in-
and out-group spillovers from the preceding period. However, only in-group
outcomes prove to be signiﬁcant. Furthermore, it should be noted that in-
and out-group spillover ﬂows are only modestly correlated (ρ = .208). In
18





Fixed Eﬀects (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3)
In.groupt−1 .181*** .188*** .124*** .360*** .328*** .263***
(.022) (.037) (.023) (.026) (.039) (.027)
Out.groupt−1 .072 .042 .052 -.007
(.045) (.031) (.050) (.037)
In.gt−1 x -.009** -.008**
period (.004) (.004)








Constant 2.556*** 2.682*** 2.931*** 2.247*** 2.633*** 2.958***
(.101) (.134) (.167) (.118) (.174) (.216)
Random Eﬀects
Subject (Sd) .953 .963 .962 .966 .974 .956
(.054) (.055) (.055) (.056) (.062) (.062)
Group (Sd) .199 .244
(.164) (.144)
Observations 2520 2520 2520 2520 2520 2520
(180) (180) (180) (180) (180) (30) (180) (30)
Log-likelihood -3738.8 -3709.5 -3707.9 -3971.0 -3937.7 -3930.2
Mixed-eﬀect regression coeﬃecients, speciﬁcations vary with respect to included random
eﬀects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. **Signiﬁcant at 1%; *Signiﬁcant at 5%;
+Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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to imperfect conditional cooperation.
Among other explanatory variables, model (3) includes ’period’, recon-
ﬁrming the signiﬁcant decline in contributions over time. More importantly,
we have built into a parallel model a time-dependent interaction term with
in- and out-group spillovers. Model 2 reveals a time trend in the relative
importance of in-group spillovers. Negative interaction between period and
received spillovers indicates an attenuating impact of within-group condi-
tioning in the decision process over time. In other words, a vicious circle of
declining contributions and lessening impact of feedback is created whereby
the aggregate provision of a public good is driven toward the opportunistic
prediction.
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined the characteristics of human behavior in a
nested social dilemma game with positive interdependencies. With the help
of the Spillover Game, introduced in section 2, the theoretical analysis of
voluntary cooperation mechanisms is extended to intergroup cooperation,
largely neglected in the standard models of public good provision. Distin-
guishing between opportunism and local and global eﬃciency, we have ex-
perimentally demonstrated the importance of in-group beneﬁciaries.
We ﬁnd that the observed behavior in a nested intergroup social dilemma
game is signiﬁcantly determined by imperfect conditional cooperation in the
sense of mainly relying on local level feedback. At the same time, the rel-
ative importance of received spillovers attenuates over time. The dynamics
20
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 022of voluntary cooperation in a nested collective action problem with posi-
tive interdependencies can be understood by the coexistence of conditional
cooperation and opportunistic preferences.
The Spillover Game and its experimental implementation are designed
to explore the nature of human behavior in nested action situations where
externalities exist at multiple scales. Experimental designs such as the one
presented in this paper may contribute to our understanding of voluntary
cooperation within and between asymmetric groups that are inherent in hu-
man social organization. We are conﬁdent that the study of nested social
dilemmas between groups yields relevant insights to decision-making about
the incentives to contribute to a common cause when there are potential ben-
eﬁts at multiple scales. This opens up a perspective for new research designs
that allow studying governance and communication structures within and
between positively interdependent groups.
The primary nature of local beneﬁciaries stresses the importance of close-
knit solidarity in public good provision, suggesting that the emergence of so-
cial norms is predominantly supported through local level interaction. When
relating our ﬁndings to the policy analysis of collective action problems, the
importance of local scale interaction and inclination toward the in-group is
stressed. Results provide empirical evidence supporting the potential beneﬁts
of building a strong local commitment to encourage the provision of public
goods with positive externalities (Ostrom, 2009). We have to acknowledge
the strong local level emphasis of conditional cooperation when designing
mechanisms and determining eﬀective units of governance to promote re-
source conservation and a sustainable provision of public goods.
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